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A violation of procedure invariance in preference measurement is that the 
predominant or prominent attribute looms larger in choice than in a match­
ing task. In Experiment 1, this so-called prominence effect was demonstrated 
for choices between pairs of options, choices to accept single options, and 
preference ratings of single options. That is, in all these response modes the 
prominent attribute loomed larger than in matching. The results were 
replicated in Experiment 2, in which subjects chose between or rated their 
preference for pairs of options which were matched to be equally attractive 
either in the same session or 1 week earlier. On the basis of these and 
previous results, it is argued that the prominence effect is a reliable pheno­
menon. However, none of several cognitive explanations which have been 
offered appears to be completely viable.
INTRODUCTION
Previous research in decision making indicates that normatively equivalent 
procedures of preference measurements do not result in the same prefer­
ence order. For instance, judgements and choices are not always in perfect
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agreement (e.g. Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 
1983; Tversky, Sattah, & Slovic, 1988; see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1992b, for a review). Such violations of procedure invariance may be 
traced to differences in decision makers’ cognitive processing of infor­
mation. In this vein, it has been found that multi-attribute options are 
processed more completely when subjects make judgements than when 
they make choices (BiUings & Scherer, 1988; Lindberg, Gärhng, & 
Montgomery, 1989; Westenberg & Koele, 1990; 1992).
Recently, Slovic et al. (1990) and Tversky et al. (1988) demonstrated a 
judgement-choice discrepancy which they termed the “prominence” 
effect. This effect has been obtained in the simplest possible case when 
subjects are presented with two options described by two attributes, for 
instance two alternative medical treatments which differ in effectiveness 
and pain relief. One of the attributes (e.g. effectiveness) is selected to 
be predominant or prominent. A prominence effect is observed when 
subjects, in choosing one of the options, place more weight on the 
prominent attribute (i.e. effectiveness) than they do in a matching task. In 
the matching task, subjects are similarly presented with both options, but 
one attribute value is missing for one of the options. The subjects’ task is 
to supply a value which makes the two options equally attractive.
Subsequently, the prominence effect has been replicated by Mont­
gomery, Gärling, Lindberg and Selart (1990) and Montgomery, Selart, 
GärUng and Lindberg (1994). Two alternative cognitive explanations have 
been offered. One is the compatibility hypothesis first proposed by Tversky 
et al. (1988). An alternative explanation, the restructuring hypothesis, was 
suggested by Montgomery et al. (19%; 1994). Both hypotheses are 
reviewed briefly below.
The Compatibility Hypothesis
According to Slovic et al. (1990) and Tversky et al. (1988), the prominent 
effect reflects a general principle of compatibility according to which the 
processing of input (e.g. attributes describing options in a judgement or 
choice task) depends on how compatible it is with the output (i.e. subjects’ 
responses). Identical components on both the stimulus and the response 
side enhance compatibility. Such components include the use of the same 
scale units (e.g. grades, ranks), the direction of relations (e.g. whether the 
correlation between input and output variables is positive or negative), 
and the numerical correspondence (e.g. similarity between the input and 
output variables). Another form of compatibility is that the qualitative 
response in choice is more compatible with a choice rule (such as the 
lexicographic rule; see Svenson, 1979), which renders quantitative weight­
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ing of attributes unnecessary. In contrast, quantitative judgements are 
compatible with quantitative weighting.
In order to account for their results, Montgomery et al. (1994) suggested 
a modification of the compatibility hypothesis. Instead of compatibility 
between choice rule and response, they assumed that the required output 
from subjects needs to be compatible with the structure o f infomwtion in 
input. Whereas choices are different from both quantitative matching and 
preference ratings, the latter are different from the former in calling for 
ratings of single options rather than judging one difference relative to 
another. Thus, one may expect a prominence effect also for preference 
ratings, although it is not possible to predict how strong it will be relative 
to that for choice.
Slovic et al. (1990) suggest two psychological rationales for the com­
patibility hypothesis. One is that non-compatibility requires additional 
mental operations which subjects avoid. A second rationale is that a 
response mode primes or focuses attention on the compatible features of 
the input.
The Restructuring Hypothesis
The restructuring explanation of the prominence effect is based on the 
dominance-structuring theory of decision making proposed by Mont­
gomery (1983; 1989). In this theory, it is assumed that subjects making 
choices restructure the available information to make one option dominate 
the other(s). Subjects may therefore increase differences between options 
on important attributes and decrease differences on unimportant attri­
butes. Similar assumptions have been made more recently by Svenson 
(1992). If there is one prominent and one non-prominent attribute, as a 
result of the restructuring process, the former will have more influence, 
since the difference on that attribute is enlarged relative to the latter.
The restructuring hypothesis has been investigated using two methods: 
(1) attractiveness ratings of attribute levels in connection with the choices 
being made (Montgomery et al., 1990), and (2) think-aloud reports (Mont­
gomery et al., 1994). An indication of restructuring is that the differences 
between rated attractiveness of attribute levels change. From think-aloud 
protocols, the frequency of evaluative statements is compiled (Mont­
gomery & Svenson, 1989). Restructuring is then similarly inferred from 
changes in these frequencies. As noted by Montgomery et al. (1994), the 
latter may be a more sensitive measure.
Collecting think-aloud reports is essential for distinguishing the restruc­
turing explanation from the compatibility hypothesis. According to the 
former hypothesis, changes in relative frequencies of evaluations of attri*
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bute levels are expected. In cx>ntrast, the compatibility hypothesis predicts 
differences in attention to attribute weights.
Problems and Experimental Hypotheses
Montgomery et al. (1990; 1994) investigated the relative merits of the 
compatibility and restructuring hypotheses. In line with the standard 
procedure (Tversky et al., 1988) used to demonstrate the prominence 
effect, subjects chose between two options, which through a prior match­
ing task had been made equally attractive. In addition, other groups 
of subjects rated their preference for each option. The results of both 
studies showed restructuring in connection with choices. Consistent with 
the restructuring hypothesis, Montgomery et al. (1990) demonstrated 
a prominence effect for choices. However, although no restructuring 
was observed, like Fischer and Hawkins (1993) in a more recent study, 
Montgomery et al. (1994) found an equally strong prominence effect for 
preference ratings. A crucial factor accounting for the latter appeared to 
be whether options were presented simultaneously rather than sequentially 
(Birnbaum, 1992; Lindberg et al., 1989). Furthermore, the prominence 
effect also appeared to be reduced if subjects were asked to rate the 
attractiveness of the options’ attribute levels on the same trials as they 
performed preference ratings. By focusing their attention on the non- 
prominent attribute, both factors may induce subjects to use a compensa­
tory decision rule. Since the strength of the prominence effect for choices 
was not affected by simultaneous ratings of attribute levels, the cause of 
the effect may be different from that for preference ratings.
If restructuring explains the prominence effect, a factor which increases 
restructuring should be expected to increase the prominence effect as well. 
Furthermore, increased restructuring accompanied by an increased prom­
inence effect is expected for choices but not for sequentially presented 
preference ratings. Montgomery (1983; 1989) and Svenson (1992) both 
assume that the importance of a decision is a motive for restructuring. A 
decision may be more important if the consequences have personal rele­
vance. In Experiment 1, two different sets of pairs of choice options were 
constructed. One set consisted of options which were framed as personally 
relevant, the other set consisted of options which were not directly per­
sonally relevant. The higher degree of personal relevance was expected to 
increase restructuring, and therefore an increased prominence effect is 
predicted from the restructuring hypothesis. In contrast, no difference is 
predicted from the compatibility hypothesis. Different groups of subjects 
who either made choices or performed preference ratings were given the 
different sets of choice options. Think-aloud protocols were obtained as a 
means of assessing the degree of restructuring.
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Personal relevance or involvement was found by Borgida and Howard- 
Pitney (1983) to increase the saliency of less important information. This 
finding suggests that subjects may give more attention to the non- 
prominent attribute when presented with personally relevant choice prob­
lems. Even though compatibility does not change, this may result in a 
weaker prominence effect. Such an outcome would give credibility to 
one of the rationales behind the compatibility hypothesis, namely that the 
non-prominent attribute is less attended. However, in contrast to the 
predictions from both the restructuring and compatibility hypotheses, if 
personal relevance increases attention to the non-prominent attribute, a 
reduced prominence effect would be expected for both preference ratings 
and choices.
That options are presented simultaneously rather than sequentially 
was found to increase the prominence effect for preference ratings 
(Montgomery et al., 1990; 1994). In these experiments, options were 
always presented simultaneously when subjects made choices. Consistent 
with findings obtained by Payne, Bettman, Coupey and Johnson (1992a), 
sequential presentation is Ukely to reduce restructuring. The question was 
therefore raised whether a weaker prominence effect would also be 
obtained for choices if options were presented sequentially. Under dif­
ferent conditions in Experiment 1, subjects were asked to make choices of 
pairs of options which were presented simultaneously or singly, just as they 
were in the preference-ratings conditions of Montgomery et al. (1990; 
1994).
In previous experiments (Montgomery et al., 1990; 1994), the promin­
ence effect was assessed by comparing choices or preference ratings 
obtained from one group of subjects with another group who performed 
the matching task. In Experiment 2, the question was raised whether a 
prominence effect would also be obtained if the same subjects performed 
the matching task, either on the same or on a different occasion as they 
performed the choice or preference-rating task. If both tasks are per­
formed on the same occasion, this may counteract restructuring and 
decrease the prominence effect for choices. It may also decrease the 
prominence effect for preference ratings when they entail choices, as 
they are assumed to do when options are presented simultaneously. 
Furthermore, since performance of the matching task on the same or 
a different occasion does not affect compatibility, no difference in promi­
nence effect was expected on the basis of the compatibility hypothesis.
Table 1 summarises predictions of the prominence effect from both 
versions of the compatibility hypothesis and from the restructuring hypo­
thesis. Only the revised compatibility hypothesis and the restructuring 
hypothesis predict a prominence effect for both choices and preference 
ratings under what is called a standard condition (simultaneous presenta-
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TABLE 1
Predictions of the Prominence Effect from Different Hypotheses
Compatibility Hypothesis 
Decision Rule vs Response Information Structure vs Response Restructuring Hypothesis
Choice Preference Rating Choice Preference Rating Choice Preference Rating
Standard condition:
Simultaneous presentation of
options, personally less relevant problems,
non-simultaneous matching Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experimental conditions
Personally relevant problems 0» No 0 0 + +
Sequential presentation of options' 0 No - - 0
Personally relevant problems, sequential
presentation of options 0 No — - +
Simultaneous aspect ratings/matchings 0 No — - -  -
Simultaneous aspect ratings/matchings,
sequential presentation of options 0 No — — — -
“TTie experimental conditions are in other respects the same as the standard condition.
*’0 denotes no change, + an increase and -  a decrease in the prominence effect compared with the standard condition. 
‘'Choices in this condition are assumed to correspond to choices to accept.
tion of options, personally less relevant decisions, and non-simultaneous 
matching or attribute ratings). The prediction is confirmed by previous 
results (Montgomery et al., 1^0; 1994). However, it should be noted that 
the prediction from the restructuring hypothesis is based on the assumption 
that preference ratings entail choices when options are presented simulta­
neously. Against this is the view that the evidence for restructuring in 
connection with preference ratings is unequivocal (Montgomery et al., 
1990; 1994). Thus, the revised compatibility hypothesis is more plausible, 
since it explains the prominence effect for preference ratings without 
assuming restructuring.
Under the present experimental conditions (changes of the standard 
condition), the original compatibility hypothesis never predicts a promi­
nence effect for preference ratings. Furthermore, for choices it does not 
predict any change in the strength of the effect. In contrast to the 
restructuring hypothesis, neither of the compatibility hypotheses predicts 
a stronger prominence effect for personally relevant choice problems. 
Another difference between the revised compatibility and restructuring 
hypotheses is that the latter does not predict a weaker prominence effect 
for choices of options presented sequentially.
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Method
Subjects. Seventy-two undergraduate students of psychology at Göte­
borg University served as subjects in return for payment. Twelve subjects 
were randomly assigned to each condition.
Materials. The materials consisted of eight choice problems, each of 
which comprised two alternative medical treatments. There were two 
possible attributes or outcomes, one of which was assumed to be more 
important or prominent than the other. The outcomes could range from 
1, defined as an extremely small degree of the attribute, to 100, defined 
as an extremely large degree of the attribute. Attribute levels were selected 
on the basis of the results of a pilot study. In this study, 24 individually 
serving subjects recruited from the same population as in the main study 
were presented with the eight choice problems. As in the main study, half 
of the subjects were given problems which were assumed to be personally 
relevant; the other half of the subjects were given problems which were 
assumed to be personally less relevant. The difference was created through 
the descriptions (as described below), whereas the attributes remained the 
same. The subjects’ task was first to fill in a missing value so that the
options appeared equally attractive, then to indicate which attribute they 
considered to be the most important.^ The missing values were chosen as 
the least attractive levels of the non-prominent attributes, which was 
expected to result in the largest prominence effect for choices (Tversky 
et al,, 1988). In constructing the choice problems, pooled mean values^ 
from the two conditions of the pilot study were used to create options 
which were equally attractive. Table 2 displays the prominent and non- 
prominent attributes and their levels entailed by the different choice 
problems. Across the different problems, the order between the prominent 
and non-prominent attributes was counterbalanced. When both options 
were presented simultaneously, whether the option with the highest value 
for the prominent attribute (termed prominent option) was presented 
above or below was also counterbalanced across problems.
Procedure. The subjects participated individually in sessions lasting for 
about 40 min. One-third of the subjects made choices of options presented 
pairwise on separate pages in a booklet. Another third accepted or 
rejected options which were presented singly. The final third of the 
subjects performed preference judgements of singly presented options. In 
each condition, the order was individually randomised. In the conditions 
with sequential presentation, pairs of options comprising the choice prob­
lems in the simultaneous presentations were maximally separated.
In the choice conditions, subjects indicated with a cross which one in the 
pairs of options they preferred. The typewritten descriptions of personally 
relevant choice problems read as follows (exemplified with #1): "Suppose 
you need medical treatment for a serious disease. There exist two different 
treatment programmes. One is more effective but gives less pain relief. 
The other is less effective but gives more pain relief. The figures below 
indicate on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely small) to 100 (extremely
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‘The same information is obtained from the matched value as follows. If u denotes the 
attractiveness of the attribute levels, matching is supposed to correspond to the equality Up p 
~  “P.PN =  “NPJ4P ~ “pjMp (where the first index refers to the prominent/non-prominent 
option defined as the option with the highest/lowest value for the prominent attribute, and 
the second to the prominent/non-prominent attribute). Assume further that u is related to 
the attribute levels x  through u ^  a + bx (where b is an attribute weight assigned to the 
prominent and non-prominent attributes, respectively), so that bp/b^f =  (jCnp.np ~  J^p.np)/ 
(j^p.p -  ^np.p)- Thus, the smaller the difference between attribute levels, the higher the 
weight (prominence) for that attribute. Conversely, from the ratio of the differences, the 
weight ratio can be calculated.
^On average, the ratio between the weights for the prominent and non-prominent attributes 
was 1.60 in the condition with personally relevant choice problems and 1.17 in the other 
condition. Despite the mean difference in ratios, /-tests indicated that none of the differences 
between the conditions were reliable {P = 0.05) for the different problems.
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TABLE 2
Attribute Levels* for Choice Problems (Medical Treatments) Presented to
Subjects
Attribute Option 1 Option 2
1. Medical caref’ 65 54
Freedom from disturbance 47 62
2. Health improvement 61 52
Comfort 48 64
3. Efficiency 56 47
Pain relief 46 58
4. Medical skill 59 42
Freedom from fees 35 55
5. Food value 66 51
Size of food portions 49 63
6. Protection against relapse 55 40
Programme shortage 35 52
7. Medical follow-up 56 43
Freedom from encroachment 28 59
8. Communication with staff 66 51
Leisure 46 63
“Attribute levels are expressed on a scale from 1 to 100. 
‘Prominent attribute in italics.
large) the extent to which the treatments are effective and pain-relieving, 
respectively. If you had a choice, which treatment would you choose?” For 
the other set of choice problems, the descriptions read as follows (the bits 
omitted were the same as above): “The community which is responsible 
for medical care has a choice between different treatments. In this case 
there exist two different treatments . . . Which treatment do you think 
should be chosen?”
The descriptions were essentially the same in the other conditions. In 
the choice-to-accept condition, subjects indicated with a cross for each 
option whether it was acceptable or not. In the remaining conditions, 
preference ratings were made of each option on a scale ranging from 1 
(extremely bad) to 100 (extremely good).
All subjects were instructed to report orally their thoughts while making 
preference ratings or choices. If silent for more than approximately 10 sec.
the subjects were prompted to continue to report their thoughts. The 
verbal protocols were tape-recorded and later transcribed.
Results
Preference Ratings, Choices Between Options, and Choices to Accept. 
Preference ratings, choices between options, and choices to accept were 
scored in an equivalent fashion. A score of 1 was assigned if the prominent 
option in each pair was chosen, accepted or given the highest preference 
rating. If both options received the same preference rating, or were both 
accepted or rejected, a score of 0.5 was assigned. In Table 3 the mean 
response scores are given for each response mode and problem type.^ As 
indicated by the fact that the mean response scores were reliably larger 
than 0.50 for all response modes and problem types (P <  0.001), a 
prominence effect was uniformly obtained. Some differences in strength 
of the prominence effect are evident in the table. A response mode (3) x 
problem type (2) analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that the inter­
action between response mode and problem type was significant [F(2,66) 
= 3.78, P < 0.05]. For choices between options, Tukey post-hoc tests 
showed that the prominence effect was reliably smaller for personally 
relevant problems and reliably larger for choices to accept. For preference 
ratings, there was no significant differences. For the personally relevant 
problems, the prominence effect was furthermore reliably smaller for 
choices between options than for the other response modes. For the 
personally less relevant problems, the prominence effect was reliably 
larger for choices between options than for the other response modes.
Think-aloud Reports. The processing of the think-aloud reports fol­
lowed the procedure developed in previous research (e.g. Montgomery 
et al., 1994; Montgomery & Svenson, 1989; Svenson, 1989). First, the 
transcribed protocols were partitioned into statements corresponding to a 
main sentence or a string of words that could be rewritten as a sentence. 
Second, each statement was coded with respect to (1) which of the options, 
if any, it referred to, (2) which of the attributes, if any, it referred to, and 
(3) whether it was a positive evaluation, a negative evaluation or a neutral 
statement. Statements referring to the required ratings, choices between 
options, or choices to accept were not coded. The coded statements could 
apply to attributes, options without any attribute specified, or attribute 
levels for a specified option. A statement in which the subject compared
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^Analyses performed separately for each problem confinned the results obtained at the 
aggregated level.
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TABLE 3
Mean Response Scores for Choice and Preference Rating (Experiment 1)
Response Mode
Choice Choice to Accept Preference Rating
Personally relevant 0.78 0.87 0.85
Personally less relevant 0.90 0.78 0.81
the attractiveness of both options was coded as a positive evaluation of the 
preferred, and a negative evaluation of the non-preferred, option. Coding 
was made by one judge. The reliability was determined to be satisfactory, 
as indicated by 85% agreement for a randomly chosen 10% of all state­
ments coded by an additional judge.
Statements which did not refer to options or attribute levels are given 
in Table 4. As revealed by a response mode (3) x problem type (2) x 
attribute (2) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor, no 
significant effect was found on the mean number of statements (attention 
index). In a parallel ANOVA on the mean difference between the number 
of positive and negative sentences (evaluation index), the prominent 
attribute received a significantly higher value than the non-prominent 
attribute [F(l,66) = 129.17, P <  0.001].
Previous studies of restructuring of choice problems (Dahlstrand & 
Montgomery, 1984; Montgomery & Svenson, 1989) have shown that the
TABLE 4
Means of Indices of Attention to and Evaluation of Attributes (Experiment 1)
Attention Index Evaluation Index
Prominent
Attribute
Non-prominent
Attribute
Prominent Non-prominent 
Attribute Attribute
Choice
Personally relevant 13.08 12.58 9.25 -1.25
Personally less relevant 15.25 15.80 9.25 -6.67
Choice to accept
Personally relevant 15.33 14.33 13.33 -8.17
Personally less relevant 16,50 16.42 10.83 -2.92
Preference rating
Personally relevant 16.17 18.83 14.83 -5.50
Personally less relevant 18.00 18.50 16.67 -7.50
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TABLE 5
Means of Indices of Attention to and Evaluation of Attribute Levels (Experiment 1)
Preferred Option
Prominent
Option
Non-prominent
Option
Non-preferred Option
Prominent Non-prominent 
Option Option
Attention index
Choice
Personally relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Personally less relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Choice to accept
Personally relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Personally less relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Preference rating
Personally relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Personally less relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Evaluatkm index
Choice
Personally relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Personally less relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
Choice to accept
Personally relevant 
Prominent attribute 
Non-prominent attribute
2.42 
1.67
2.42
1.42
1.67
1.25
2.50
1.17
3.42
2.33
2.17
2.33
2.08
-0.83
2.33
-1.25
1.50
-0.92
0.50
0.67
0.17
0.17
0.08
0.33
0.58
0.42
1.00
0.25
0.42
0.50
-0.33
0.67
-0.08
0,17
0.08
0.17
0.08
0.25
0.08
0.08
0.42
0.50
1.33
1.17
0.75
0.83
1.00
0.58
0.08
-0.25
-0.08
-0,08
-0.08
0.50
1.25
0.92
1.58
0.75
2.58
1.42
3.00
2.17
5.33
3.25
2.25 
1.83
-1.08
0.25
-1.42
0.75
1.42
-1.42
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Preferred Option Non-preferred Option
Prominent
Option
Non-prominent
Option
Prominent
Option
Non-prominent
Option
Personally less relevant
Prominent attribute 2.33 0.42 0.33 2.33
Non-prominent attribute -1.17 0.25 0.83 -1.50
Preference rating
Personally relevant
Prominent attribute 3.08 0.33 -0.08 4.67
Non-prominent attribute 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -2.08
Personally less relevaru
Prominent attribute 2.00 0.42 0.83 2.25
Non-prominent attribute -0.83 -0.33 0.42 -0.83
amount of attention to, and positive evaluation of, an option depends 
on whether it is finally preferred or not. Therefore, the attention and 
evaluation indices confined to attribute levels were calculated separately 
for options which were preferred (either chosen or receiving a higher 
preference judgement) and non-preferred, respectively (Table 5). In a first 
set of ANOVAs, the factors prominent/non-prominent and preferred/non­
preferred option were crossed. Since these factors jointly interacted with 
some of the remaining factors, a second set of response mode (3) x 
problem type (2) X attribute (2) x option (2) ANOVAs excluded pre­
ferred non-prominent and non-preferred prominent options. Due to more 
attention to the levels of the prominent attribute, in the ANOVA on the 
attention index the main effect of attribute reached significance [F(l,66) 
= 18.93, P <  0.001]. A significant interaction between response mode and 
option was also obtained [f(l,66) = 9.62, P < 0.001], reliably modified 
by problem type [F(l,66) = 3.69, P < 0.05]. More attention was given to 
the non-preferred than to the preferred option for choices to accept and 
preference ratings, whereas the reverse was true for choices between 
options. For preference ratings, the difference was confined to personally 
relevant problems.
The ANOVA on the evaluation index showed that the levels of the 
prominent attribute were evaluated as reliably higher than the levels of 
the non-prominent attribute [F(l,66) = 80.13, P  <  0.001], and that reliably 
higher evaluations were given to preferred than to non-preferred options 
[F(l,66) = 5.71, P < 0.05]. In the ANOVA including the factor prominent/
non-prominent option, response mode interacted reliably with preferred/ 
non-preferred option [F(l,66) = 3.48, P < 0.05]. When excluding this 
factor, the interaction was nearly significant [F(l,66) = 2.49, P < 0.10]. 
The difference in evaluation between preferred and non-preferred options 
was larger for choices between options than for the other response modes. 
In Tukey post-hoc tests, only the former difference was significan t. As 
revealed by significant interactions between response mode and attribute 
[F(l,66) = 10.79, P < 0.001], and between response mode, attribute and 
option [F(l,66) = 20.01, P < 0.001], for choices the difference between 
preferred and non-preferred options was reliably larger on the prominent 
attribute than for the other response modes. However, the difference was 
more, rather than less, negative on the non-prominent attribute.
Discussion
Whether choices between options were construed as personally relevant 
or not did not seem to have an unequivocal effect. As predicted from the 
restructuring hypothesis, personally relevant problems affected the promi­
nence effect for preference ratings. However, the effect was in the 
expected direction only for choices to accept. In addition, the think-aloud 
protocols did not indicate that personal relevance increased restructuring.
Evidence for restructuring preceding choices between options was 
obtained, in that the difference between the evaluations of preferred and 
non-preferred options were larger for choices between options than for 
preference ratings. However, choices to accept did not differ from pre­
ference ratings. A problem with the think-aloud data appears to be that 
sequential presentation led to positive evaluations of both levels of the 
prominent attribute and negative evaluations of both levels of the non- 
prominent attribute. More comparisons were thus made when both options 
were available simultaneously. To the extent that the think-aloud protocols 
can be interpreted as showing more restructuring for choices between 
options than for the other response modes, the results are inconsistent with 
the restructuring hypothesis, since there were no differences in prominence 
effect.
Against the compatibility hypothesis is the fact that, in the think-aloud 
protocols, more attention was not given to the prominent attribute. 
However, the prominent attribute was generally more highly evaluated 
than the non-prominent attribute. The compatibility hypothesis is also 
contradicted by the fact that an equally strong prominence effect was 
obtained for choices and preference ratings. This is in hne with previous 
results (Montgomery et al., 1991; 1994).
In the present experiment, a simultaneous presentation mode did not 
increase the prominence effect. In contrast with previous studies (Mont-
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gomery et al., 1990; 1994), presentation mode was varied for the quali­
tative (choices) rather than for the quantitative (preference ratings) 
response. Since the prominence effect for preference ratings, but not the 
prominence effect for choices, appears to be affected by presentation 
mode, the explanation may be that a simultaneous presentation mode 
increases comparisons between options (Bimbaum, 1992; Montgomery 
et al., 1994).
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EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Subjects. Another 48 undergraduate students recruited from the same 
population served as subjects in return for payment. Twelve subjects were 
randomly assigned to each condition.
Materials. The materials consisted of the same eight choice problems 
as in Experiment 1, which were framed as being personaUy relevant.
Procedure. The subjects participated in groups of four, half of whom 
performed all tasks in a single session lasting about 20 min. The remaining 
subjects participated in two 10-min sessions separated by 1 week. In each 
sub-group, half of the subjects made choices of pairwise presented options, 
the other half performed preference judgements of one of the options in 
each pair.
In the choice conditions, the subjects who participated in one session 
received a booklet in which the choice problems were presented twice in 
two blocks according to the same individually randomised order. One 
 ^ value was missing for each choice problem—either the largest or smallest
t value for the prominent attribute, or the largest or smallest value for the
non-prominent attribute. Across subjects and problems, which value was 
missing was counterbalanced. In the booklet, the attributes and options 
were ordered so that the missing value always appeared down on the right. 
On each trial, the subjects first filled in the missing value to make the 
options appear equally attractive, then they were requested to choose one 
of the options. ITie instructions told the subjects that “ . . . despite that 
the options should be equally attractive, you may nevertheless, on a closer 
look, find one of them to be more attractive” .
Preference ratings were first made of one of the options in a pair, then 
of the other one when the choice problem was presented the second time. 
Which option was judged first was counterbalanced across subjects. A 
scale ranging from 1 (extremely bad) to 100 (extremely good) was used.
In the conditions with two sessions, the subjects performed the matching 
task in the first session. The choice problems were presented only once. 
In the second session, the missing values for each subject were replaced 
by those which he or she had filled in during the first session. The values 
obtained were printed in a new version of the booklet. Exactly as in the 
single sessions, the problems were presented twice. Choices were then 
made for each problem, whereas preference ratings were made for each 
option in each of the problems.
Results and Discussion
From the matching results it was possible to calculate the ratio of the 
weights for the prominent and non-prominent attributes, respectively (see 
footnote 1). As shown in Table 6, these ratios were somewhat higher than 
in Experiment 1. This was most likely due to the fact that the missing 
values were not always the lowest value on the non-prominent attribute 
(cf. Tversky et al., 1988). However, a matching condition (2) x response 
mode (2) ANOVA on the mean ratios across problems did not yield any 
significant differences (P >  0.05).
The choices and preference ratings were scored as in Experiment 1. A 
score of 1 was assigned each time the prominent option was preferred in 
a pair, whereas a score of 0.5 was assigned if both options received the 
same preference rating. As Table 7 shows, consistent with previous results 
(Montgomery et al., 1990; 1994) a prominence effect was obtained in each 
condition. In a response mode (2) x same/different session (2) ANOVA, 
the response scores were reliably different from 0.50 in all conditions (P 
<  0.001). As expected from the restructuring hypothesis, the prominence 
effect was reduced when subjects performed the matching task in the same 
session. However, neither the main effect of session [F(l,44) = 2.32, 
P <  0.20], nor its interaction with response mode [F(l,44) <  1], reached 
significance. In addition, the observed tendency was in particular observed 
for the preference ratings rather than for the choices as was expected. 
Thus, in these respects, the results were more consistent with the revised 
compatibility hypothesis.
TABLE 6
Mean Ratios of Weights for Prominent and Non-prominent Attributes 
for Choice and Preference Rating (Experiment 2)
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Choice Preference Rating
Same Session Different Sessions Same Session Different Sessions
2.58 2.88 2.87 2.30
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TABLE 7
Mean Response Scores for Choice and Preference Rating (Experiment 2)
Choice Preference Rating
Same Session Different Sessions Same Session Different Sessions
0.83 0.86 0.75 0.82
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In both experiments in the present study, the prominence effect (Slovic 
et al., 1990; Tversky et al., 1988) was replicated. Although the options 
were matched to be equally attractive, the option with the highest value 
on the predominant or prominent attribute was more often chosen. This 
held true irrespective of whether the same or different subjects performed 
the matching task, whether the same subjects performed the matching task 
in the same or in a different session, or whether the missing values were 
the same or varied. As noted by Slovic et al. (1990), the prominence effect 
appears to be a reliable phenomenon.
(insistent with previous findings (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Mont­
gomery et al,, 1994), a prominence effect was also observed for preference 
ratings. In Experiment 1, a prominence effect was similarly found for 
choices to accept an option. Thus, the present results corroborate the 
generality of the prominence effect. At the same time, they question the 
explanations of the effect which have been offered.
Unless there is some other explanation of the prominence effect for 
preference ratings, observing such an effect is not in agreement with the 
compatibility hypothesis proposed by Slovic et al. (1990) and Tversky 
et al. (1988). This hypothesis only predicts a prominence eff^ ect for choices 
(Table 1). In addition, the think-aloud protocols did not indicate that 
subjects attended more to the prominent attribute as the hypothesis 
implies they would.
However, the alternative explanation of the prominence effect, the 
restructuring hypothesis (Montgomery, 1983; 1989; Montgomery et al., 
1990), did not fare any better. The think-aloud protocols in Experiment 1 
supported the assumption that subjects restructured the choice problems 
more frequently when they made choices between options than when they 
made preference ratings of sequentially presented options. In disagree­
ment with the hypothesis, however, restructuring was not more frequent 
for choices to accept than for preference ratings. Furthermore, only in 
the case of choices between options was the observed restructuring
accompanied by a prominence effect. Since a prominence effect was 
obtained for the preference ratings and choices to accept, restructuring 
cannot be a sufficient explanation.
The protocols further revealed that construing the problems in Experi­
ment 1 as personally relevant did not lead to more restructuring. One 
possibility is that restructuring cannot be affected in this way unless certain 
other conditions prevail. For instance, the differences in attractiveness of 
attribute levels may need to be small for restructuring to occur. Another 
possibility is that subjects did not interpret the personally relevant prob­
lems as more important, since they were very similar in content to the 
personally less relevant problems. Since content cannot easily be changed 
without altering the structure of the choice problems, a possibility would 
be to manipulate accountability. In contrast to Experiment 1, this was done 
by Simonson and Nye (1992, experiments 1,2 and 5). The subjects in their 
high-accountability condition were told that they would later have to 
explain the basis of their choices to others. The subjects in the low- 
accountability condition received the same choice problems but were not 
asked to provide an explanation. The results suggested that this manipula­
tion decreases the prominence effect, whereas the restructuring hypothesis 
predicts an increase. However, since the results were not clear-cut, they 
need to be replicated.
Montgomery et al. (1994) proposed a revised compatibility hypothesis 
to account for their results. This hypothesis makes similar predictions 
as the restructuring hypothesis (Table 1). An important difference is 
nevertheless that no effect is expected for personally relevant problems. 
Disregarding an effect in the opposite direction confined to choices 
between options, the results were consistent with the revised compatibility 
hypothesis. Yet, in disagreement with the hypothesis, a prominence effect 
was observed in Experiment 1 for choices to accept an option. Also in 
disagreement with the hypothesis, in Experiment 2 a prominence effect 
was found when subjects simultaneously performed the matching task. 
Still, the prominence effect tended to be weaker in this condition com­
pared with a condition when the matching task was performed in a 
different session.
The main contribution of the present study is to provide further evidence 
for the generality of the prominence effect. In particular, it has been shown 
that preference ratings are equally susceptible to the effect as choices are. 
However, it appears that none of the explanations offered is completely 
viable.
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